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Abstract 
I study how organizational form and local market structure influence retail firms' corporate 
social performance (CSP). The theoretical model is based on agency theory, which in its origin 
focuses on the dyad between the principal and the agent. I extend this perspective and examine 
how characteristics of the environment outside the dyad influence the outcomes. Retail stores 
vary in their organizational form and thereby in their incentives to maximize profits. I 
hypothesize that the different incentives, together with differences in monitoring costs and 
principal demand influence CSP. Further, developments in agency theory have suggested that 
the local market structure can influence the effects of the chain-store contracts. Competition 
can give corporate stores stronger incentives to maximize profits, and reputation effects can 
increase the profitability of CSP. The main contribution of this dissertation is testing these 
predictions empirically with data on the CSP of retail stores and chains. The dissertation 
consists of an introduction, three independent empirical articles, and a conclusion. 
In the first article (“Franchising, local market characteristics and alcohol sales to minors in 
retail”) I study how the influence of organizational form (franchised vs corporate store) on CSP 
depends on competition, market size and public monitoring and sanctions. As the measure of 
CSP I use the results of alcohol purchase attempts done by underage teens in retail stores. 
Control variables are collected from other sources. As hypothesized I find that franchised stores 
are more likely to sell alcohol to minors, and that they are more sensitive to the risk of sanctions. 
However, I find no relationship between competition and performance, and corporate stores 
and not franchised stores improve their performance in small markets.  
The second article (“Market structure, chain membership and food hygiene in retail”) studies 
how chain membership and competition influence food hygiene in supermarkets. In Denmark, 
the “Smiley scheme” makes the results of hygiene inspections by food authorities public. I 
hypothesize a U-shaped relationship where low and high levels of competition give better 
quality, since stores with little competition are located in small markets with strong reputation 
effects. I further hypothesize that chain stores are less sensitive to competition, since chains 
standardize quality. I get robust support for the U-shaped relationship between competition and 
quality, but limited support for the lower sensitivity of chain stores to competition. 
In the third article (“Retail chains’ corporate social responsibility signaling”) I study how the 
retail chain's organizational form influences its CSP signaling. I hypothesize that vertically 
integrated chains are more likely to signal CSP since they have less problems getting their stores 
to commit to common investments in CSP than other chains. I also include other hypotheses 
testing signaling theory. The data comes from a content analysis of the web pages of 208 retail 
chains in the Norwegian market, combined with information from other sources. As 
hypothesized, I find that franchise chains are significantly less likely and plural and voluntary 
chains marginally less likely to signal CSP than integrated chains. Two of the other three 
hypotheses testing signaling theory are supported.  
In total, the findings give partial support to agency theory. For the direct effects of 
organizational form the hypotheses are supported. Franchised stores have lower social 
performance when monitoring costs are high but there are smaller differences between 
independent and chain stores when monitoring costs are lower. The chain-store contract also 
has consequences for CSP at the chain level. For the moderating effects of the local market 
structure, agency theory is not supported.   
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1 Introduction 
To build and maintain their reputation and competitive position and achieve economies of scale, 
retail chains standardize many parts of their operations across their store network (Mathewson 
and Winter 1985; Ingram and Baum 1997). Prices and products are relatively similar, quality 
and service levels comparable, and marketing campaigns and opening hours coordinated. At 
the same time stores and store managers have to be encouraged to run as efficiently as possible 
by cutting costs and increasing sales and profits, and given sufficient freedom to adjust to 
different local market conditions (Sorenson and Sørensen 2001). The chain has to find the 
balance between incentives and standardization; too strong economic incentives can lead the 
store manager to abandon the chain standards and reduce quality below what is acceptable to 
increase his or her personal financial gains, too weak incentives can lead the store manager to 
be indifferent and do a poor job.  
A theory much used to study such problems of retail organization is agency theory. Agency 
theory uses the metaphor of the contract to study relationships where one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another party (the agent) (Eisenhardt 1989; Shapiro 2005). For retail chains, 
an important question is whether to use franchised stores, where the store is owned and operated 
by an independent party with a contract specifying the terms, or corporate stores, where the 
chain employs the store manager. This choice of organizational form can have consequences 
for different types of store performance, the franchisee has strong financial incentives to 
maximize sales and minimize costs, but may go too far and reduce quality below an acceptable 
level for the chain (Kidwell and Nygaard 2011; Michael 2000). A considerable literature has 
studied the free riding problem in franchising (e.g. Kidwell, Nygaard, and Silkoset 2007; 
Michael 2000; Rokkan and Buvik 2003). Free riding occurs when a store gets the benefits from 
belonging to the chain but does not take its part of the costs (Kidwell, Nygaard, and Silkoset 
2007, 525). Since franchisees keep their own profits they have incentives to reduce quality if it 
benefits them, also when this comes at the expense of the other members of the chain who 
suffers from a worse reputation. The reality of this problem has been confirmed empirically. 
Franchised units have worse hygiene than corporate units belonging to the same chain (Jin and 
Leslie 2009), are more likely to break laws to gain extra profits (Pierce and Toffel 2013), charge 
more for the same products (Ater and Rigbi 2013; Wilson 2012a), and are more likely to pay 
their employees less than they are obliged to by law (Ji and Weil 2009).  
What is notable about these empirical studies is that they do not only show how free riding 
affects the chain's reputation, which can be damaged should information about the poor 
performance become public, but also how the free riding negatively affects third parties, such 
as customers, employees or society in general. The strong financial incentives of franchising 
make stores maximize their profits, sometimes at the expense of others. Treatment of third 
parties is part of a firm's corporate social performance (CSP). CSP is briefly defined as 
“corporate pro-social behavior” (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009, 201), or more extensively as a 
“business organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social 
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's 
societal relationships” (Wood 1991, 673). In essence, CSP measures whether a firm behaves 
acceptably by legal and ethical standards towards others, by following laws and regulations and 
respecting the integrity and well-being of those affected by the firm's operations. The first 
purpose of this dissertation is to examine the effect of the chain-store contract/organizational 
form on CSP. Do franchised stores have lower CSP than corporate stores, like the findings in 
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the literature on free riding suggest? If so, do independent stores, with stronger financial 
incentives and no chain to control their behavior, have yet lower levels of CSP?  
In agency theory the unit of analysis is the contract between the principal and the agent. 
However, all dyadic relationships are embedded in a wider set of social and economic 
institutions with the potential to influence the behavior of the parties, including how they write 
and respond to the contract (Granovetter 1985). In marketing, the importance of the 
environment surrounding marketing channels has long been recognized (Arndt 1981; Achrol, 
Reve, and Stern 1983). Developments in agency theory have also acknowledged that 
characteristics of the markets outside the dyad, such as competition and reputation effects, can 
influence the outcomes of different types of contracts (Hart 1983; Shapiro 1982). Competition 
can make managers of corporate stores more efficient as they have to work harder to keep up 
with competitors (Tirole 1988). Reputation effects can reduce the profitability of free riding for 
franchised stores, as the true quality of the firm becomes known to customers (Jin and Leslie 
2009). The second main purpose of this study is to examine how characteristics of the local 
market such as competition and market size interact with the chain-store contract to shape store 
social performance. Previous studies have examined the consequences of the local market 
structure for the choice of organizational form (Dahlstrom et al. 2009; Nygaard and Myrtveit 
2000). In this dissertation I go one step further and examine actual performance outcomes when 
different types of contracts meet different types of market structures.  
The dissertation is structured in the following way: This introductory chapter presents the 
theoretical framework and describes the main research model. Three independent empirical 
articles follow. Finally, the concluding chapter sums up the findings and contributions. 
1.1 Theoretical framework: Agency theory in retail 
Agency theory uses the metaphor of the contract to model relationships where one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent) (Eisenhardt 1989). The principal-agent problem 
generally deals with “motivating one person or organization to act on behalf of another” 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The principal and the agent typically have different interests, the 
principal wants maximum effort for minimum pay and the agent wants maximum pay for 
minimum effort. The principal has to design the optimal contract for the agent, taking into 
account the costs of monitoring the agent, since the agent always will have more information 
about his own effort and performance. The principal has two general options for this, either a 
behavior-based or an outcome-based contract.  Eisenhardt (1989, 58) sums up the theory in the 
following way: “the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract governing 
the principal-agent relationship (…). Specifically, the question becomes, is a behavior-oriented 
contract (e.g., salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an outcome-oriented 
contract (e.g., commissions, stock options, transfer of property rights, market governance)?”. 
The outcome-based contract aligns the interests of the parties to a larger degree. However, since 
the agent is more risk-averse than the principal and since the outcomes are partly decided by 
factors outside his control, the agent may be reluctant or demand a high premium to accept this 
(Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr. 1992). Agency theory has been used to study a wide range of 
phenomena in economics, management, marketing, law and sociology (Shapiro 2005). In 
marketing, agency relationships are abundant since exchange between two parties is the essence 
(Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr. 1992). Agency theory has therefore been applied on issues such 
as how to organize interorganizational relationships (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998) and how 
to compensate salespeople (Eisenhardt 1988; Anderson and Oliver 1987).  
6 
In retail, empirical studies have used agency theory to study chain organization (Dant, 
Grünhagen, and Windsperger 2011; Brickley and Dark 1987; Combs, Michael, and 
Castrogiovanni 2004). The central problem has been whether retail chains are better off using 
franchised or corporate stores. In retail franchising, the chain (franchisor) sells the rights to use 
the brand name and business systems to the store owner (franchisee). The franchisee normally 
has to provide an initial investment in the store, and pays royalties, often as a percentage of the 
sales, to the franchisor. The franchisee has the right to the profit after the costs are paid. In 
corporate stores, the store manager is an employee and the chain has the right to any profits. 
Franchisees have strong financial incentives to maximize their profits, which aligns their 
interests with those of the chain, who also are interested in increased sales and reduced costs. 
However, the problem for the retail chain with using franchising is the potential free riding by 
the stores. Free riding occurs “when an individual obtains indivisible benefits from being a 
member of a group but does not bear a proportional share of the costs” (Kidwell, Nygaard, and 
Silkoset 2007, 525). Since franchisees maximize their own profits, they have incentives to 
reduce investments in activities that they only partly get the benefits from, such as activities 
relating to the reputation of the chain as a whole (Lafontaine 1999). Such activities can be 
product and service quality or common marketing activities. To make sure that stores adhere to 
quality standards, chains monitor the performance of their stores, but, monitoring is costly, and 
even with high investments in monitoring it is impossible to measure all dimensions of 
performance perfectly. Research has therefore focused on how the monitoring costs influence 
the choice between franchised and corporate units. Where monitoring costs are high, franchised 
stores should be favored, and where monitoring costs are low, corporate stores should be more 
efficient (Combs, Michael, and Castrogiovanni 2009).  
Agency theory has generally been supported empirically in the retail context (Combs, Michael, 
and Castrogiovanni 2004; Combs et al. 2011). For instance, empirical studies have found 
support for the influence of monitoring costs on choice of organizational form (Combs and 
Ketchen 2003). Longer distance from the headquarters and larger unit size, both variables that 
make monitoring more costly, increases the likelihood of franchising (Brickley and Dark 1987; 
Alon 2001). The danger of free riding has been used as an explanation for why franchised chains 
invest less in advertising than integrated chains (Michael 1999), and for why the percentage of 
franchised units in hotels and restaurant chains is negatively related to quality as perceived by 
the customer (Michael 2000). Recent studies have also found support for the free riding 
hypothesis at the store level. For instance, franchised restaurants have been found to have worse 
food hygiene than corporate stores belonging to the same chain (Jin and Leslie 2009), and 
franchised restaurants have larger amounts of back-wages (wages owed to their employees but 
not paid) than corporate restaurants in the same chains (Ji and Weil 2009). 
While much of the research using agency theory in retail has focused on explaining the choice 
between franchising and corporate units, the theory has also been applied on other types of 
organizations in retail. Agency theory may be used to explain the existence of retail chains 
overall (Dahlstrom et al. 2009). Chain stores have to follow specific standards, and give up 
some freedom for the benefits that follow common standards, such as reputation and economies 
of scale (Ingram and Baum 1997; Kosová and Lafontaine 2012). If it is too difficult to maintain 
a common standard due to the risk of free riding, independent units will be more efficient. Table 
1 gives a summary of the different organizational forms in retail, highlighting the differences 
in incentives at the store level and chain management control over the store.  
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Table 1: Contracts in retail 
 Independent store Franchised store Corporate store 
General description Independently owned 
and operated store 
Franchisee operates store 
according to contract with 
chain (franchisor) 
Retail chain owns and 
operates store through 
store manager 
Investments and 
incentives 
Owner makes 
investments and has the 
right to profits 
Franchisor and franchisee 
both makes investments. 
Franchisee has right to 
profits, franchisor normally 
gets % of sales as royalty 
Retail chain makes 
investments and has the 
right to the profits 
Chain control over 
store  
None High – chain controls 
products, prices, brand 
concept. Franchisee mainly in 
charge of personnel 
Highest – chain controls 
everything 
Partly adapted from Dahlstrom et al. (2009, 843) 
 
1.1.1 The influence of the local market structure in agency theory 
In its origin agency theory mainly deals with the contract between the principal and the agent. 
However, all dyadic relationships are embedded in a wider set of social and economic 
institutions with the potential to influence the behavior of the parties, including how they write 
and respond to the contract (Granovetter 1985) In marketing, the importance of the economic 
and institutional environment surrounding marketing channels has long been recognized (Arndt 
1981; Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983; Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002; Anderson, Håkansson, and 
Johanson 1994). The political economy framework in marketing (Stern and Reve 1980; Arndt 
1983) sees marketing channels as political economies consisting of the distribution channel and 
the channel environment, where the environment influences the outcomes in the channel. 
Related research in marketing has used the basic insight that contracts are influenced by the 
surrounding channel environment, and among other things studied how incentives and 
governance mechanisms in one relationship influence other relationships (Wathne and Heide 
2004; Kumar, Heide, and Wathne 2011) and how dependence (the lack of outside alternatives) 
between the exchange partners influence their relationship (Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Kumar, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Gulati and Sytch 2007).   
The potential influence of the local market has also been recognized in agency theory, and some 
studies have examined how competition and reputation influence the outcome of contracts. 
Agency theorists have suggested that the competitive pressures of the market may work as an 
incentive scheme in itself (Hart 1983). If competition is tough, managers have the incentives to 
improve the performance of their units to stay in business, especially since they may be 
competing with other firms where the owner is also the manager and who therefore do not have 
the same principal-agent problem. The slack necessary for the managers to shirk their 
responsibilities is simply not available in highly competitive markets (Tirole 1988). Even store 
managers will be concerned about tough competition, as their job may be in danger if they 
perform poorly. In the case of retail, this means that independent stores, franchised stores and 
corporate stores would compete in the same market, and the competition from independent and 
franchised stores would constrain the managers of the corporate stores (Nygaard and Myrtveit 
2000). Based on this theory, retail chains should use corporate stores to a higher degree in 
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markets with tough competition. Empirical tests of this prediction have however not found 
support for this (Nygaard and Myrtveit 2000; Dahlstrom et al. 2009). 
Agency theory has also recognized the role of reputation as a mechanism to ensure good quality 
(Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1982; Jin and Leslie 2009). Consumers and others can use the 
reputation of a firm or a product as a signal of quality, even if quality is directly unobservable 
to them. Free riding will then be less profitable for franchised stores, since they may lose 
customers. Previous research in franchising has focused on the role of reputation in the choice 
of organizational form. Since firm reputation can reduce the problem of free riding, franchising 
should be relatively more efficient in locations with strong reputation mechanisms and vertical 
integration more efficient in locations with weak reputation mechanisms. Empirical support is 
mixed. Brickley and Dark (1987) found that franchised units were more common in sectors 
with more repeat customers, and also that monitoring costs were lower in these sectors. 
However, when examining the organizational form of units close to highway, where there 
presumably are less repeat customers, they found significantly more franchised units, contrary 
to expectations. Kidwell et al. (2007) also found less free riding among franchisees located 
close to highways. On the other hand, Nygaard and Myrtveit (2000) found more company 
owned and operated dealers close to highways. 
In total, while the potential influence of competition and reputation has been recognized in 
agency theory, empirical research in retail has given mixed results. Further, the studies have 
mainly examined the choice of organizational form and not the performance outcomes of such 
choices.  
1.2 Corporate social performance 
The dependent variable in this dissertation is corporate social performance (CSP). CSP is a 
concept much used and studied in the fields of management and strategy (Aguinis and Glavas 
2012; Wood 2010) and has been defined as “corporate prosocial behavior” (Luo and 
Bhattacharya 2009, 201) or more extensively as a “business organization's configuration of 
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, 
and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships” (Wood 1991, 693). 
CSP is closely related to a range of other concepts such as stakeholder theory, business ethics 
and corporate misbehavior, but in particular corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR has 
been defined as “context-specific organizational actions and policies that take into account 
stakeholders' expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, social, and environmental 
performance” (Aguinis and Glavas 2012), or in the perspective of economics “the private 
provision of public goods” (Bagnoli and Watts 2003). The main difference between CSR and 
CSP is the added emphasis on actual performance outcomes in CSP. In one sense, CSP is the 
result of attempting to measure the CSR of a company (Crane and Matten 2010).  
While CSP can be seen as part of firm or product quality, it emphasizes the total social impact 
of the firm's operations, including the consequences for third parties. CSP cover the treatment 
of the groups affected by the firm's operations, such as employees (a firm with high CSP for 
instance pays fair wages and secures a safe working environment), customers (a firm with high 
CSP for instance provides safe products of good quality and advertise honestly), suppliers (a 
firm with high CSP for instance writes fair contracts and do not behave opportunistically) and 
civil society (a firm with high CSP for instance pay fair taxes and support good causes). Some 
make a distinction between environmental and social performance, but others include 
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environmental performance as a dimension of CSP, since all groups in society depend on the 
environment (Waddock and Graves 1997; Phillips and Reichart 2000).  
CSP is a broad theoretical concept measured in many ways (Wood 2010). Some studies use 
indices of CSP (Siegel and Vitaliano 2007; Brammer and Millington 2008; Barnett and 
Salomon 2012). These indices are typically constructed by consultancies to investment firms, 
and include measures on involvement in activities that are seen as unethical (such as weapons 
production, alcohol, or nuclear power) as well as indicators on issues such as community 
relations, corporate governance, diversity, human rights and the environment (Wood 2010). 
One disadvantage with the indices is that they typically only exist for large, public firms. Other 
studies have used communication about social and environmental issues in annual reports, on 
web pages or through other channels as the measures of CSP (Fifka 2011), based on the 
assumption that firms with better performance are more likely to communicate about it. Since 
CSP deals with the impact of firms' on various stakeholders (groups that are affected by the 
firm's operations), it is also possible to measure this impact by asking the stakeholders directly. 
Customer satisfaction surveys, for instance, are measures of how satisfied one particular 
stakeholder is with an important part of the firm's activities (Wood 2010; Anderson, Fornell, 
and Lehmann 1994). Finally, CSP is also measured using different types of objective data such 
as the level of toxic emissions (Khanna and Damon 1999), number of announced product recalls 
(Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009) contributions to charity (Campbell and Slack 2006) or 
regulatory violations or crimes (Pfarrer et al. 2008).  
A long-standing debate is whether high levels of CSP are a result of altruistic actions or a firm's 
strategic efforts to maximize profits (Siegel and Vitaliano 2007). The altruistic perspective 
suggests that owners or managers willingly sacrifice profits to benefit groups in society. Owners 
can based on their own preferences decide to provide better CSP than what will maximize 
profits, for instance by paying employees more than the market price or by not engaging in 
certain types of legal activities due to their own ethical preferences. Alternatively, the altruistic 
actions can be done by managers, who take advantage of the information asymmetries between 
themselves and their owners (the agency problem) and use firm resources for good causes 
instead of maximizing profits for the owners (Friedman 1970). The competing, strategic 
perspective of CSP suggests that firms use good CSP to improve their relationship with groups 
that the firm depends on, such as customers, employees, local communities, NGOs, media and 
regulators, thereby maximizing their profits (Campbell 2007; Aguinis and Glavas 2012). In the 
strategic perspective, good CSP can be used to improve the reputation and attractiveness of the 
firm and its products. Some empirical studies support this perspective. Firms with good CSP 
have higher customer satisfaction and are therefore more valuable (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). 
Customers also are more forgiving with firms that have good CSP if an accident or negative 
event happens (Klein and Dawar 2004). In industrial markets, firms with good CSP have better 
relations with their customers or suppliers (Homburg, Stierl, and Bornemann 2013). Firms with 
good CSP are more attractive employers (Turban and Greening 1997; Jones, Willness, and 
Madey 2013), and employees are more committed and satisfied when they work for an 
employer with high CSP (Kim et al. 2010; Brammer, Millington, and Rayton 2007; Valentine 
and Fleischman 2008).  
If firms use CSP as a strategic tool, firms with high CSP should be more profitable. The 
relationship between CSP and firm financial performance is much studied and contested 
(Griffin and Mahon 1997), but the latest evidence from meta-studies and reviews suggests a 
weak, positive relationship. Summarizing 52 previous quantitative studies, Orlitzky et al (2003) 
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find a positive relationship for social and environmental performance on financial performance. 
In a review of 251 studies, Margolis et al (2009) also find a positive although weak relationship. 
Some recent studies have found a positive, U-shaped relationship, where low CSP gives better 
financial performance than moderate CSP and high CSP gives the best financial performance 
(Brammer and Millington 2008; Barnett and Salomon 2012). Recent studies with a research 
design more suitable to uncover a causal relationship have also found a positive relationship. 
Based on a regression discontinuity design, Flammer (Forthcoming) studies the adoption of 
CSR-related shareholder resolutions narrowly adopted (versus narrowly rejected), and finds 
that adopted CSR resolutions improves financial performance.  
Another way of testing the strategic theory of CSP is to examine the relationship between 
competition and CSP (Fernández-Kranz and Santaló 2010). If CSP is a strategic tool to 
differentiate from competitors in the aim of attracting customers, employees or investors, higher 
levels of competition should give better CSP. The altruistic theory predicts the opposite, since 
tough competition gives less resources to devote to good causes. Fernández-Kranz and Santaló 
(2010) find robust evidence of a positive relationship between competition and CSP.  They find 
market concentration negatively related to CSP, that increased competition due to higher import 
penetration improves CSP, and that firms in more competitive industries have better 
environmental performance. Other studies of competition and CSP find the same (Hawn and 
Kang 2013; Declerck and M’Zali 2014), including Flammer (Forthcoming), who finds that 
reductions in tariff rates which exposes domestic producers to more competition from abroad 
improve CSP for companies in the affected industries.  
1.2.1 Agency theory and CSP 
Agency theory, like the strategic view of CSP, suggests that firms will produce the level of CSP 
that maximizes their profits (Connelly, Ketchen, and Slater 2010). In a simple agency-
theoretical model of CSP, groups interested in good CSP (the principals) contract the firm (the 
agent) to provide good CSP. The principals can be several groups, but owners, customers, 
employees and regulators may be particularly important, since these have direct ways of 
influencing the firm by giving or withdrawing financial support. Owners have the possibility of 
demanding good CSP directly from their firms. Even individual investors in anonymous public 
stock markets can reward firms based on CSP by investing only in firms that satisfy certain 
criteria for good CSP, or avoid investing in particularly poor performers. Similarly, customers 
can select firms and products that satisfy their personal preferences and employees can choose 
to work for firms with high levels of CSP, essentially making the cost of labor cheaper for such 
firms. Public authorities can draft laws and regulations, and use a variety of instruments to make 
firms follow them, including licensing systems, inspections and monitoring, and sanctions. 
Firms and in certain cases the managers and employees responsible who do not follow rules are 
faced with fines or other types of financial or criminal punishments. Such an “expanded” 
agency model goes beyond the typical owner-manager and manager-employee relationships 
often studied as principal-agent relationships. However, it is clear that all relationships where 
one party acts on behalf of another are agency relationships (Shapiro 2005), and that agency 
theory also applies to social and informal contracts and not only written, formal contracts 
(Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr. 1992).  
Agency theory predicts that the firm (as the agent) will produce good CSP only when the 
principals demand it. For dimensions of CSP that are not demanded firms have no financial 
incentives to provide high levels of performance. The different principals may prioritize CSP 
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that affect them directly. Customers' willingness to pay for environmental performance is for 
instance often found to be limited (Ambec and Lanoie 2008; Steg and Vlek 2009). Illustrating 
the importance of principal demand is the case of “unethical demand” (Pierce and Snyder 2013) 
where good CSP is the opposite of the interest of the customer. In vehicles emission testing, a 
private garage is responsible for testing whether a car has an acceptable emissions level. The 
customer wants the car to pass the inspection, but society wants acceptable emission levels. 
Unsurprisingly, a percentage of cars that pollute too much pass the test, since the garage and 
the customers share this interest (Bennett et al. 2013).  
Another prediction following agency theory is the influence of monitoring costs on performance. 
One of the key dimensions in agency theory is information asymmetry. Typically, the agent has 
more information than the principal about his own performance or effort, and the principal has 
to design the optimal contract in this situation (Husted 2007; Banerjee 2002). The theoretical 
positive relationship between CSP and financial performance rests on relevant groups 
rewarding good performance by selecting or rewarding good performers over bad performers 
(Brammer and Millington 2008). The empirical studies of the CSP-financial performance 
relationship have mainly been based on easily observable measures of CSP, such as information 
disclosed by the firm itself or ratings by stakeholders. Since judgments of CSP can only be 
based on available information, the ratings may be biased. For dimensions of CSP where the 
information asymmetry is high and where outsiders have difficulties with ensuring performance, 
the relationship may not be positive. Many dimensions of social performance have very high 
monitoring costs for outsiders, including credence attributes (Darby and Karni 1973). Credence 
goods are products or services where an expert knows more about the quality than the consumer 
himself or herself, even after the consumer has bought and used the product (Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer 2006). It is for instance difficult to know whether a product has been produced 
with acceptable conditions for the workers along the supply chain, or with acceptable levels of 
pollution. Some dimensions of social performance, for instance animal welfare or fair trade, 
have “Potemkin attributes”, where the quality cannot be assessed at the end product by for 
instance government agencies or consumer interest groups, and monitoring along the 
production stages are necessary, adding greatly to the monitoring costs (Jahn, Schramm, and 
Spiller 2005). When it is too costly for outsiders to measure the true performance, it may be 
profitable for the agent to reduce performance. While firms with good performance can signal 
their performance to outsiders, the availability of costly signals may be limited, and the result 
may be that good CSP is not available in the market (Spence 1973). 
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1.3 Retail contracts and corporate social performance 
Following agency theory and the strategic view of CSP, retail chains and stores will produce 
the amount of social performance that maximizes their profits (Connelly, Ketchen, and Slater 
2010). A retail store's and chain's CSP will be decided by the relationship between CSP and 
profitability for the store and for the chain. Whether good CSP is profitable depends on 
incentives, monitoring costs, and demand from principals such as customers or regulators. At 
the store level, incentives to maximize profits vary according to the chain-store contracts, or for 
independent stores the absence of such contracts. Independent stores have larger financial 
incentives than chain stores to maximize profits, since the independent store can keep all the 
additional profit, while the chain store has to forward part of additional profits to the chain. 
Franchised stores have larger financial incentives than corporate stores to maximize profits, 
based on the same argument. The effect of the different contracts on CSP will then depend on 
the relationship between financial profitability and CSP. For issues where CSP is profitable for 
the store, independent stores have the strongest incentives to produce high CSP followed by 
franchised stores and finally corporate stores. For issues where CSP is expensive for the store, 
corporate stores should have better CSP than franchised and independent stores, since they have 
fewer incentives to reduce quality to increase profits.  
The profitability of social performance at the chain level will influence how the chain uses 
incentives and monitoring towards stores. If CSP is unprofitable for the store but profitable for 
the chain as a whole, the chain can use incentives or monitoring to influence the behavior of 
the store. In the extreme case, the chain can use behavioral contracts (corporate stores) to limit 
the problem of stores reducing quality. As always, this comes at the expense of reduced 
profitability, since corporate stores are less efficient than franchised stores, and monitoring is 
costly and difficult. The chain can include incentives for good CSP in the franchise contract, 
but again at the expense of lower incentives to increase profits, since multiple tasks always 
come with a cost to performance (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). In total, the prediction is that 
for dimensions of CSP that are profitable for the chain but unprofitable for individual stores, 
the CSP of corporate stores should be higher than the CSP of franchised stores and independent 
stores. This is parallel to the free riding problem in franchise studies (Kidwell, Nygaard, and 
Silkoset 2007) where the store has incentives to reduce quality when this is profitable for the 
store and monitoring costs for the chain are high. 
The levels of information asymmetry are important predictors of CSP. Without information 
asymmetry, no agency problems exist, since the principal simply can determine the 
performance of the agent and reward him or her accordingly (Husted 2007; Jacobides and 
Croson 2001). A retail chain, for instance, can easily achieve the optimal level of CSP in their 
stores if the two parties share the same information. The same applies for other principals, who 
can easily observe the level of CSP and reward stores or chain (the agents) that behave 
according to their preferences. Under information asymmetry the level of CSP will be the level 
of CSP demanded by principals, at least in the long run. Under information asymmetry, the 
situation is different. The retail chain has to engage in costly monitoring or the use of corporate 
stores, which reduces their profits. This may still be the optimal situation if high CSP is 
demanded. However, high information asymmetry for the retail chain also entails high 
information asymmetry for customers, who have difficulties assessing store and chain 
performance. While the firm may signal their performance to outsiders, costly signals are not 
easily always available, and the result can be that the market for good CSP collapses and only 
poor CSP is available (Spence 1973; Akerlof 1970).  
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The agency theoretical model of CSP in retail thus suggests that CSP will be high on dimensions 
with low information asymmetry that are demanded by outsiders. Under high information 
asymmetry and little demand, corporate stores should do better than franchised and independent 
stores, who have incentives to reduce quality. Empirical studies examining the influence of 
organizational structures in retail or similar industries such as hotels and restaurants on CSP 
generally support these predictions. Units that are chain members have better CSP than 
independent units on issues such as CSR activities (Blombäck and Wigren-Kristoferson 2011) 
and environmental management (Álvarez Gil, Burgos Jiménez, and Céspedes Lorente 2001). 
These are activities that may be unprofitable at the store level, but that may add to the chain's 
reputation, and chains therefore chose to implement them, often as a result of outside pressures. 
Also, independent hotels are more likely to write negative reviews about their competitors than 
chain hotels (Luca and Zervas 2013; Mayzlin, Dover, and Chevalier Forthcoming), potentially 
reflecting their higher incentives for doing so. Independent hotels benefit more from the 
negative reviews since they can keep any additional profits for themselves. Recent empirical 
studies have also confirmed the free riding problem in franchising by finding that franchised 
restaurants have lower quality or higher prices than corporate restaurants belonging to the same 
chain (Jin and Leslie 2009; Ji and Weil 2009; Ater and Rigbi 2013). Franchised units are also 
more likely than corporate units to pass cars in vehicles emission tests (Pierce and Toffel 2013). 
Note that the empirical findings on free riding have all been on dimensions of CSP with high 
monitoring costs for the chain and other outsiders. 
The profitability of CSP at the store level also has consequences for the chain. When CSP is 
unprofitable for the stores and monitoring is expensive and difficult, the chain may choose to 
reduce investments in common activities to reduce the problems of free riding. A chain might 
not make strong promises on CSP, for instance, when they fear that they may not be able to 
implement the desired level of performance at the store level. Further, knowing that other stores 
have incentives to free-ride, each store may also engage in bargaining to stop such common 
activities at the store level. Supporting this perspective, some research has found that franchised 
chains advertise less than integrated chains (Michael 1999) and on average lower quality 
(Michael 2000). The percentage of franchised stores in a retail chain has also been found to 
influence negatively the amount of CSR communication from the chain (Perrigot, Oxibar, and 
Déjean Forthcoming).  
1.4 Local market structure and corporate social performance 
1.4.1 Competition 
Competition may both improve and reduce social performance in general (Shleifer 2004). For 
dimensions of CSP valued by customers (the principal), such as product or service quality, 
competition is likely to contribute positively. Competition gives incentives to produce high 
quality since the customer easily can switch supplier. Routes with more than one airline have 
fewer delays, arguably an important dimension of product quality in airline services (Mazzeo 
2003; Greenfield 2012). Supermarkets with more competition have less inventory shortfalls, 
and when Wal-mart establishes in an area, the existing supermarkets reduce their shortfalls 
(Olivares and Cachon 2009; Matsa 2011). A positive relationship between more direct measures 
of CSP and competition have also been found, firms in industries with tough competition have 
better CSP ratings and lower toxic emissions (Fernández-Kranz and Santaló 2010; Flammer 
Forthcoming; Declerck and M’Zali 2014; Hawn and Kang 2013). However, competition and 
rivalry can also increase cheating and unethical behavior (Schwieren and Weichselbaumer 2010; 
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Kilduff et al. 2012). Soccer players for instance get more yellow and red cards when playing 
against their team's rivals (Kilduff et al. 2012), and hotels that have tough competition are more 
likely to write fake, bad reviews of their competitors (Luca and Zervas 2013; Mayzlin, Dover, 
and Chevalier Forthcoming).  
These findings are not contradictory. When a high level of CSP is demanded by the principals 
and monitoring costs not excessive, competition is likely to contribute positively towards CSP. 
Supermarkets reduce their shortfalls under tough competition because customers want to find 
their favorite products in the shelves, can observe performance easily in the store, and can go 
elsewhere if the store is sold out. The same basic logic should apply to CSP. If principals do 
not demand good CSP, or if performance is very costly to monitor for outsiders, competition 
can lead to worse CSP, as firms can reduce performance to increase profits. As already 
mentioned, in a study of vehicle emissions tests, (Bennett et al. 2013) find that firms with more 
local competitors are more likely to pass cars in the emissions test. They suggest that this is due 
to the pressure of increased competition to give the customers what they want, at the expense 
of social welfare. Others have named the practice “unethical demand” (Pierce and Snyder 2013). 
This behavior can take place since the relevant market does not value good social performance 
(reduced vehicles emissions) and the behavior of the firms testing for vehicle emissions is 
expensive to monitor for outsiders such as authorities and competitors. 
Competition does not necessarily influence all firms equally. As discussed, agency theorists 
have recognized that the competitive pressures of the market may work as an incentive scheme 
in itself (Hart 1983). If competition in a market is tough, corporate managers have the incentives 
to improve the performance of their units, especially since they may be competing with other 
firms where the owner is also the manager and who therefore do not have the same incentives 
to reduce effort. The “slack” necessary for the managers to shirk is not available.  
In total, competition should increase CSP in retail when principals demand it and information 
asymmetry is low. In such situations, competition will force firms to provide high CSP. This 
includes corporate stores, who have fewer financial incentives but will have to provide high 
levels of CSP to keep up with independent and franchised stores. Under high information 
asymmetry, competition should decrease CSP, since agents can benefit from reducing quality. 
In such situations, tough competition will lead corporate stores to reduce their quality not to 
lose out in the competition with franchised and independent units.  
1.4.2 Market size 
One potential market solution for problems of unobserved quality is consumer learning and 
firm reputation (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1982; Jin and Leslie 2009). Consumers can 
learn about the unobserved quality of a product or service by their own experience or from other 
consumers. This has consequences for the behavior of firms, since it can become profitable to 
produce good quality even if quality is not directly observable (Brickley and Dark 1987). 
Repeat customers learn about quality and make it costly to produce low quality since the future 
income stream of their business will be lost. Similarly, potential customers can learn about a 
firm's quality from other customers, the media, or expert reviews. 
Previous research has focused on the population characteristics of the local market, such as 
population density or the degree of repeat customers as proxies for the reputation effects (Jin 
and Leslie 2009; Brickley and Dark 1987). In this study I focus on the size of the local market. 
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In small geographical markets actors are aware of each other and close relationship exist 
between firms and customers and between different customers. As a result of the close 
relationships and the actors' awareness of each other in the small markets, reputation effects are 
particularly strong (Lepoutre and Heene 2006). Information about the quality of a retail store 
may quickly be spread among community members. Further, this news can easily be connected 
to the manager of the store. Empirical studies have shown that small communities rely less on 
formal governance mechanisms such as formal punishments and more on informal methods 
(Henrich et al. 2010). A particularly relevant study is McDevitt's (2011) analysis of the impact 
of reputation in small and large markets. He hypothesizes that firms in small markets are less 
likely to change their names to get rid of a poor reputation, since customers in small markets 
will recognize the firm anyway, and that firms in small markets are more sensitive to both good 
and bad reputations. Studying plumbing firms in and around Chicago he got support for his 
hypotheses, and found that firms in small markets outside Chicago were less likely to change 
names in general and more likely to exit or change names following consumer complaints.  
Again, agency theory predicts that the effects of reputation are likely to influence firms 
differently depending on their organizational forms. Since firm reputation can be a signal of 
unobserved quality, reputation effects can reduce the problem of free riding by franchisees. In 
small markets, franchisees have incentives to improve their quality relative to corporate stores 
since they benefit from a good reputation.  
In total, retail stores in small markets should show higher levels of CSP when demanded by 
principals, even on dimensions of performance with high information asymmetry, as the 
reputation effects reveal true quality and give firms incentives to improve. Franchised stores 
have particular financial incentives to improve their quality not to lose out in the competition 
with corporate stores, and the reputation effects in small markets should therefore reduce 
performance differences between the organizational forms.   
1.5 The research model illustrated 
Illustration 1 shows the general research model for the dissertation. The general proposition is 
that due to the different profit motives at the store level, organizational form will have 
consequences for CSP, and that this effect will be moderated by the size of and competition in 
the local market.  The specific hypotheses are included in the individual articles. 
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Illustration 1: The research model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 The relevance of the research 
The research aims to improve the understanding of how different types of contracts in principal-
agent relationships are influenced by important factors outside the contracts itself, namely 
competition and reputation. While the articles in the dissertation use the retail sector as an 
empirical context, agency relationships are abundant in most areas of life (Shapiro 2005). The 
central choice in agency theory, and in many real-life situations such as employee and CEO 
compensation, buyer-supplier relationships or public regulation of companies, is between a 
behavior based or outcome based contract. This dissertation contributes to the understanding 
by studying factors outside the contract itself that influence the results. 
The relevance may be particularly high in retail. In the last decades the trend has been towards 
more domination of chains over independent stores (Levy and Weitz 2012; Basker, Klimek, 
and Pham 2010), and the franchise form of organization have grown in popularity (Dant, 
Grünhagen, and Windsperger 2011). This research will contribute to a better understanding of 
when the different organizational forms are likely to succeed, and their strengths and 
weaknesses from the perspectives of both the firm and society. Since the beginning of 
franchising there have been discussions about potential negative effects, but concerns have 
mainly been about unequal power relationships between franchisors and franchisees (Hunt 1972; 
Storholm and Scheuing 1994). However, there may be other effects that also should guide 
chains in their choices of organizational form and governments in their design and 
implementation of laws and regulations. 
It is also important to understand the drivers of social performance in the retail sector. The retail 
sector is a large and important part of the economy with a considerable impact on the society. 
In Norway, where the data for two of the three articles in the dissertation comes from, the retail 
sector makes up for around 10% of GDP (Statistics Norway 2013a) and employs around 370 
000 people in more than 53 000 firms (Nygaard and Utgård 2011). Retail firms are the 
middlemen between producers and consumers, and can influence both. The determinants of 
CSR in retail are important to understand from a societal perspective, since retailers link the 
final consumers with suppliers and producers, translating the interests of the consumers for CSR 
into pressure upstream in the supply chain (Ytterhus, Arnestad, and Lothe 1999). Large retailers 
also have considerable power in the relationship with its suppliers, sometimes so much that it 
raises concern about the well-being of other actors (Bloom and Perry 2001), and it has been 
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suggested that retail chains are in practice creating their own private standards regarding CSR 
(Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Arentsen 2009).   
1.7 The articles in the dissertation  
The dissertation consists of three independent articles, testing parts of the theoretical model in 
different contexts and with different data. In the first article (“Franchising, local market 
characteristics and alcohol sales to minors in retail”) I study how the organizational form of the 
retail store interacts with competition, the risk of sanctions, and market size to influence the 
store's social performance. This is the most complete test of the main research question in the 
dissertation. As a measure of CSP I use alcohol sales to minors, which previous research have 
found to be relatively common, despite being illegal. The data for alcohol sales is collected by 
underage teens as mystery shoppers, and is combined with data about the local market and an 
extensive set of control variables collected from a range of other sources.  
In the second article (“Market structure, chain membership and food hygiene in retail”) I study 
the influences of chain membership and competition on food hygiene in supermarkets. Previous 
research has generally found a positive relationship between competition and quality. I 
hypothesize a U-shaped relationship, where low and high levels of competition give better 
quality, since stores with little competition are located in small markets with strong reputation 
effects that also can influence quality positively. I further hypothesize that chain stores are less 
sensitive to competition, since chains to a large extent standardize store quality. The data about 
food hygiene quality comes from the Danish veterinary and food administration who regularly 
inspects all firms that sell food. The results of the inspections are published both outside the 
supermarket and online, making it easy for customers to evaluate quality. 
In the third article (“Retail chains' corporate social responsibility signaling”) I study how the 
retail chain's organizational form influences its CSP signaling on its web pages. I hypothesize 
that vertically integrated chains are more likely to signal CSP than franchised, plural and 
voluntary chains, since these chains have larger problems getting their stores to commit to 
common investments in CSP and CSP signaling. I also include other hypothesis testing 
signaling theory. The data is based on a content analysis of the web pages of 208 retail chains 
in the Norwegian market, combined with information about the chains collected from other 
sources.  
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Table 2: Overview of the articles 
Article Key IVs Moderators DV Data 
Franchising, local 
market 
characteristics and 
alcohol sales to 
minors in retail 
Franchised vs 
corporate 
store 
Competition 
Market size 
Risk of 
sanctions 
Alcohol sales 
to minors 
Alcohol sales data collected by 
underage NGO members. Other 
variables collected from a range of 
sources. 
Market structure, 
chain membership 
and food hygiene in 
retail 
Chain store vs 
independent 
store 
Competition 
Market size 
Hygiene 
inspection 
score 
Data from Danish veterinary and 
food administration on hygiene 
inspections of supermarkets.  
Retail chains' 
corporate social 
responsibility 
signaling 
Chain 
organizational 
form 
 CSR signaling 
on web page 
Data set with 208 chains from the 
Norwegian market. Content 
analysis for CSR signaling, other 
variables collected from secondary 
sources. 
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The papers of this dissertation (pages 21-86) are not available in BI Brage, due to copyright matters: 
 
Paper 1:  
Franchising, local market characteristics and alcohol sales to minors in retail 
 
Paper 2:  
Market structure, chain membership and food hygiene in retail 
 
Paper 3:  
Retail chains' corporate social responsibility signaling  
 
 
5 Summary and conclusions 
The main purpose of this research has been to study how retail chain contracts influence 
corporate social performance (CSP) and how this effect is influenced by local market size and 
competition. High levels of CSP can be profitable for firms when customers or other groups 
value it, but unprofitable when not demanded or difficult to observe. Agency theory suggests 
that retail firms will produce the level of social performance that maximizes their profits. The 
financial incentives of individual stores depend on the chain-store contract, and this dissertation 
has therefore examined empirically whether performance varies between contracts. Further, 
agency theory suggests that competition and reputation can give agents incentives to produce 
high quality regardless of the organizational form (Hart 1983; Shapiro 1982), thereby reducing 
performance differences across contracts, This dissertation has provided empirical tests of these 
predictions.  
The dissertation has consisted of three independent empirical articles testing different aspects 
of how contract choice influences CSP. Two of the articles have also tested the moderating 
effect of local market competition and size. The first article (“Franchising, local market 
characteristics and alcohol sales to minors in retail“) studied how chain-store contracts 
(corporate or franchised store) interact with competition, the risk of sanctions and market size 
to determine alcohol sales to minors in retail stores. The second article (“Market structure, chain 
membership and food hygiene in retail”) studied how chain membership interacts with 
competition and market size to influence food hygiene in retail stores. The third and final article 
(“Retail chains’ corporate social responsibility signaling”) studied how retail chains' 
organizational forms differ in their corporate social responsibility signaling.  
5.1 Findings 
5.1.1 Retail contracts and corporate social performance 
The effect of the chain-store contract on CSP was tested in all three articles. The first article 
examined the difference between franchised and corporate stores, the second article the 
difference between chain stores and independent stores, and the third article the difference 
between different types of chains at the chain level. As hypothesized I find that corporate stores 
have better social performance than franchised stores in the case of alcohol sale to minors. In 
the second article, where I did not have a clear hypothesis, I find that chain stores have better 
social performance (measured as food hygiene quality) than independent stores under medium 
levels of competition. Under low and very high levels of competition, independent stores have 
the same social performance as chain stores. In the third article, studying CSP at the chain level, 
I find that vertically integrated chains have significantly higher CSP than franchised chains, and 
marginally better CSP than plural and voluntary chains. In total, agency theory is fully or partly 
supported for the direct effects of organizational structure on CSP in all three articles.  
5.1.2 The moderating effect of local market structure 
The potential moderating effect of the size of and competition in the local market was examined 
in the two first articles. In the first article I find no influence of competition on the effects of 
the different contracts on alcohol sales to minors. My hypothesis was that corporate stores 
would behave more like franchised stores under tough competition, since tough competition 
gives corporate managers incentives to be efficient to avoid being run out of business. I do not 
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find any effect of competition when using the number of competitors in a radius of 500 meters 
as the measure. When using other measures of competition such as the Herschman-Herfindahl 
index or number of stores in the zip code (see the appendix to the article), franchised stores are 
more sensitive to tough competition than corporate stores, contrary to the predictions of agency 
theory.  
In the second article, I find that competition influences food hygiene more for independent 
stores than for chain stores in most models. This is as hypothesized, since retail chains 
standardize the behavior of their stores to some degree, and the individual stores therefore have 
less freedom to adjust to the local market situation.   
Both the two first articles investigated the moderating effect of small markets on different types 
of contracts. In the first article, I find that stores in small markets are less likely to sell alcohol 
to minors, and that corporate stores are influenced more by the small market than franchised 
stores. Again, this is contrary to my hypothesis and the predictions of agency theory. In the 
second article, I find no significant differences between independent stores' and chain stores' 
responses in small markets. This is as implicitly predicted, since the information asymmetry is 
low and customers and chain managers relatively easy can monitor store performance.  
In total, agency theory is not supported when it comes to the moderating effects of the local 
market structure.  
5.1.3 Other findings 
All findings on variables not included in the main research model are reported in the individual 
articles, but some findings deserve special discussion. One moderating variable examined in 
the first article was public monitoring and sanctions. I find that franchised stores are more 
influenced than corporate stores by the risk of sanctions by the local municipality. This is as 
hypothesized, and consistent with a theory where franchised stores are more concerned about 
the possible financial losses from losing their sales permit for a period than corporate stores, 
thus supporting agency theory.  
Previous empirical research has found varying effects of competition on CSP, as predicted by 
agency theory (Matsa 2011; Bennett et al. 2013). When performance is demanded by the 
principal and monitoring costs are not too high, competition typically increases quality In my 
second article I partly find the same effect, supermarkets under tough competition have better 
food hygiene. Note however that the effect is U-shaped and negative for most levels of 
competition. Other studies have found that increased competition also may reduce CSP when 
information asymmetry is high (Bennett et al. 2013). I do not find robust evidence of this in 
article 1, competition has no direct influence on CSP, but in some models estimated as 
robustness checks competition increases the likelihood of franchised stores selling alcohol.  
In both articles 1 and 2, stores located in small markets have better CSP than stores in larger 
markets. They are less likely to sell alcohol to minors, and they have better food hygiene than 
stores in larger markets. This is as hypothesized, as small markets have strong reputation effects.  
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5.2 Theoretical contributions 
5.2.1 Agency theory 
The largest theoretical contribution of the dissertation is the examination of the performance 
effects of chain-store contracts under different market structures. Agency theory suggests that 
competition can reduce agency costs, since the market works as an incentive scheme itself by 
putting pressure on inefficient actors. In the context of retail chains, this should make corporate 
stores more efficient, since they risk going out of business if they do not keep up with their 
franchised or independent competitors. This prediction has previously been tested with the 
decision of whether to use franchised or corporate stores as the dependent variable (Nygaard 
and Myrtveit 2000), but this study is the first to test the actual performance effects of 
competition on different contracts. In article 1, I find no effect, and thus do not get support for 
agency theory, as competition has no effect on alcohol sales for either franchised or corporate 
stores. In article 2, I find that chain stores have similar levels of food hygiene as independent 
stores at high levels of competition. In low levels of competition the theory would predict better 
hygiene for independent stores, but I do not find this, since stores at low levels of competition 
have similar levels of hygiene. I argue that this is a result of the small markets securing good 
quality. In the setting of the Danish food hygiene scheme the monitoring costs for the retail 
chain are low due to the Smiley Scheme. It is therefore not clear how much slack corporate 
managers in reality have.  
Another contribution is showing how small markets can reduce agency costs. Previous studies 
have suggested that larger markets have lower agency costs because monitoring is relatively 
cheaper and competition tougher (Brickley and Dark 1987). I hypothesize and find in two of 
the studies that small markets reduce agency costs for the principal. Stores in small markets 
have better food hygiene and lower probability of selling alcohol to minors. My explanation is 
mainly that the reputation effects are particularly strong in small markets. The importance of 
reputation has been recognized in agency theory (Jin and Leslie 2009; Shapiro 1982), but this 
has not directly been connected to the market size. I also argue that franchised stores should 
improve their performance relatively more in small markets, since the reputation effect is 
equally or more important for them, but I do not get support for this.  
Finally, the potential for franchised stores of free riding on the chain reputation has long been 
recognized theoretically, but only a few studies have shown the effect in convincing manner 
(Jin and Leslie 2009; Ji and Weil 2009; Pierce and Toffel 2013). This study confirms these 
findings in article 1, and is the first to empirically show free riding in the retail sector, as the 
previous studies have all been in the restaurant sector.  
5.2.2 Other theories 
Some findings in the dissertation also contribute to other theories and fields. The marketing 
dyad environment framework by Achrol et al. (1983) recognizes that the environment around 
the dyad will influence both structure and processes within the dyad. The framework includes 
competitors and regulatory agents as two important groups of actors with impact on the focal 
dyad. This research has confirmed the influence of both groups, and shown that competition 
can reduce agency costs for the chain in the retail chain-store dyad. It has also shown that 
regulatory agents, such as the local municipality with their monitoring and formal punishment, 
and small markets, can influence the outcomes of contract choice in the dyad. Overall, the 
findings give some support to the marketing environments framework. 
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The dissertation also contributes to the understanding of the importance of the local market as 
a governance mechanism in retail. Retail stores have a specific geographical location. The 
importance of adjusting the quality and product offerings to the local preferences has long been 
understood, but this dissertation also illustrates how important the local market is in governing 
social performance. 
The dissertation contributes to a recent and growing literature on the relationship between 
competition and quality. Several studies, also in retail, have found a positive relationship 
between competition and quality when quality is important and visible (Matsa 2011; Olivares 
and Cachon 2009), but a negative relationship when quality is difficult to observe (Bennett et 
al. 2013; Mayzlin, Dover, and Chevalier Forthcoming). This dissertation gives partly 
supporting evidence for the differential effects of competition, which improves food hygiene 
under low information asymmetry, but does not influence alcohol sales.  
A final contribution is to the growing literature in the field of forensic economics, which is the 
field where economic methods are used to detect and understand behavior that the parties 
involved in would prefer to keep hidden (Zitzewitz 2012). Alcohol sales to minors is such a 
behavior, and while in line with several other articles (Jin and Leslie 2009; Zinman and 
Zitzewitz 2012) the first article in this dissertation finds that the financial incentives influence 
the likelihood of economic actors to engage in unethical or illegal activities, the article 
contributes by showing how market structure can moderate this effect.  
5.3 Practical implications 
Managers of retail chains should be aware of the influence their organizational form has on 
social performance. The potential for free riding among franchised stores have long been 
recognized theoretically, and recent empirical studies have confirmed the problem. This 
dissertation confirms that free riding is a problem, and that even if retail chains are aware of the 
problem, they do not manage to curb it with monitoring or appropriate contracts. A natural 
managerial implication is to either invest more in monitoring, or structuring contracts 
differently by for instance including financial punishments if a store performs poorly. If chains 
increase monitoring or add sanctions, costs will increase, and the chain will have to trade off 
better performance versus increased costs. If agency costs become large enough, it will at one 
point become more profitable to use corporate stores.  
Retail chain managers should also notice the (lack of) impact of competition and market size 
on the performance of their stores. Agency theorists have suggested that competition can work 
as an extra incentive for corporate managers, but I do not find evidence of this. Competition 
improves hygiene, but more for independent stores than chain stores, and if there is any 
indication about competition increasing alcohol sales for minors, it is for franchised stores, not 
corporate stores. Taken together with previous research which has also not found any influence 
of competition, chain managers should not rely on market competition to discipline their 
managers. On the other hand, there are good reasons for retail chain managers to rely on the 
governing effects of small markets, which can improve quality considerably.  
The findings can be used by public authorities when designing their policies and monitoring 
strategies. Both the Norwegian alcohol sales monitoring and the Danish food hygiene 
monitoring system is generally based on annual inspections. However, the respective authorities 
can freely decide on any further inspections, meaning that they can take local market 
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characteristics into consideration. Based on the findings in this dissertation they should divert 
resources from corporate to franchised or independent stores and from small to larger markets.  
5.4 Limitations and future research 
One of the limitations of the dissertation is its reliance on observational and secondary data. 
The data has many strengths, it is for instance unlikely that all stores would answer honestly if 
you asked them about whether they sell alcohol to minors (Mick 1996), and the use of 
observational data reduces this problem. On the other hand, secondary data has limited ability 
to provide insight into the precise mechanisms or processes that takes place in the store. For the 
mechanisms of free riding or the perceived pressures of the market, I rely on theoretical 
arguments. In reality, I cannot rule out alternative explanations. There may for instance be 
differences in the objective levels of competition and how managers perceive competition 
(Gripsrud and Grønhaug 1985), with consequences for store performance. Some measures used 
in the studies are not ideal and can be improved in future studies by collecting primary data. In 
particular I have in mind the measures for private label use and low price strategy in article 3. 
Primary data from the chains about their pricing and brand strategies could have given more 
valid results, but were costly to collect.  
In general, the articles are based on cross-sectional data with the usual limitations about 
establishing causal effects. While I use words such as “influence” or “effect”, in reality the 
findings are correlational, and I cannot make causal claims. A general problem in the studies is 
the risk of biased estimates due to endogeneity, which is the potential correlation between the 
error term and the independent variables in a regression model (Sande and Ghosh 2014). 
Endogeneity can be caused by omitted variables, simultaneity or measurement errors. Solutions 
to this problem are generally experimental or quasi-experimental methods, including panel data 
methods (Wooldridge 2009). In the two first articles I have partly longitudinal data, but due to 
the data structure and my variables of interest pooling the data was the best option. One 
illustration: In the first article, only a couple of the stores changed organizational form between 
corporate to franchise during the period. I could therefore not use the variations over time to 
estimate the effects of organizational form. Similarly, the data set for the second article does 
not identify changes in competition in the period. Using econometric methods for panel data 
would therefore not have helped my analysis. The best option would likely have been to use 
instrumental variables techniques (Sande and Ghosh 2014; Wooldridge 2009). Such techniques 
use an instrument that is correlated with the independent variable but not directly with the 
dependent variable. The challenge is to identify relevant instruments. Previous studies in 
franchising (Kosová, Lafontaine, and Perrigot 2013; Ji and Weil 2009) have used the percentage 
of franchised units in the local market as an instrument, based on the logic that the cost of 
monitoring is reduced if there are more franchised stores in an area. It is unclear how good this 
instrument in reality is, since it is not clear what influenced the organizational form of the first 
store, or how well this would work in the Norwegian context with many small markets. Future 
studies may still want to use instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of 
organizational form.  
Throughout the dissertation I have emphasized the role of the financial incentives at the store 
level as the cause of the differences in CSP between franchised and corporate stores and chains. 
Exactly how the financial incentives shape the behavior of stores is not clear. It may be that 
franchisees are directly motivated by the monetary incentives to maximize profits by for 
instance cutting costs and reducing quality. Alternatively, franchisees may differ from corporate 
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managers in their personal values, perhaps being more concerned with financial profits and 
material benefits and less concerned with the well-being of others. There is some empirical 
evidence on the differences between entrepreneurs and employees supporting such a 
perspective, entrepreneurs may for instance be more action-oriented with some negative 
consequences for ethical considerations (Harris, Sapienza, and Bowie 2009). Franchising 
contracts also work as selection mechanisms, where only those who believe that they have the 
qualities to succeed become franchisees. This means that they may be systematically different 
from corporate managers even within the same chain. The incentives of franchising still cause 
differences in CSP, but the mechanism is different. Performance differences may be a result of 
both selection and incentive effects, and only data about managers' personalities and values 
could answer which of the mechanisms is at work. This is an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
I have argued, and found empirical support for, that small markets can improve quality. My 
theoretical explanation is that reputation effects, which can reveal quality also when quality is 
directly unobservable, are particularly strong in such markets. Again, I cannot completely rule 
out competing explanations. Firms in small markets may be more embedded in the community, 
being more concerned with the well-being of their customers and other community members. 
Firms in small markets may have access to a more stable work force, reducing training and 
monitoring costs and increasing quality. In the case of alcohol sales, if the work force is more 
stable workers may also be older and may find it easier to ask customers for ID. While I have 
tried to control for some of these alternative explanations, in particular by including market 
dummies in article 2, future studies may want to use more and other proxies for reputation to 
further establish the effect.   
One of the big discussions in the literature on CSP is the relationship with financial performance. 
This dissertation has focused only on CSP, mainly due to data limitations. It would be a 
contribution to examine the relationship between CSP and financial performance at the store 
level, using behavioral data, and not the typical reputation/rating data used in the CSP-CFP 
studies. The main challenge here is the data access; financial data at the store level is generally 
not publicly available since the chains only report at the group level. The exception is franchised 
stores, which have to report publicly since they are independent firms. A realistic future project 
is to combine the data on alcohol sales to minors with financial data for the franchised stores, 
to examine whether the financial situation is correlated with CSP.  
All three studies have used single indicators of corporate social performance as their dependent 
variables. CSP is a broad term covering different aspects of firm behavior, and the correlation 
between them is not obvious. Devoting more resources to one aspect or dimension of CSP gives 
less available resources for other aspects. This is the essence of the literature on multi-tasking 
in agency theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), which predicts that agents will shift efforts 
to those aspects that are easily observable. The prediction from this literature would be that for 
instance introducing the Smiley-scheme would make stores devote more efforts to food hygiene 
but potentially less resources for other aspects with uncertain consequences for total CSP. 
Empirical studies on CSP show mixed findings on this, Matsa (2011) found that several 
dimensions of store product and service quality was positively correlated, while Propper et al. 
(2008) found that competition influenced hospitals to reduce waiting times (easily observable) 
but decrease treatment quality (difficult to observe). To avoid or at least reduce this problem I 
would need information about several aspects of CSP, which was not available to me.   
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